Abstract. Functionality is essential to any form of anticipation beyond simple directedness at an end. In the literature on function in biology, there are two distinct approaches. One, the etiological view, places the origin of function in selection, while the other, the organizational view, individuates function by organizational role. Both approaches have well-known advantages and disadvantages. I propose a reconciliation of the two approaches, based in an interactivist approach to the individuation and stability of organisms. The approach was suggested by Kant in the Critique of Judgment, but since it requires, on his account, the identification a new form of causation, it has not been accessible by analytical techniques. I proceed by construction of the required concept to fit certain design requirements. This construction builds on concepts introduced in my previous four talks to these meetings.
INTRODUCTION
All but the simplest functioning requires anticipation to be effective. Anticipation is end-directed, and in all but the simplest cases (e.g., if a system merely happens to have an end state that its internal dynamics tend towards) anticipation is a teleological concept. Anticipation, therefore, is typically mediated by goals or ends. Thus, in most interesting cases, anticipation requires at least functionality, which can be thought of as end directed activity, and functionality itself requires anticipation. There are, however, two approaches to function that are, at least in their extreme forms, incompatible with each other. They have different criteria for what makes a function, which allows a divergence on both what is functional and on what the functions of a specific system are. To some extent this can be ignored in considerations of the relation between anticipation and function in a specific system; we can decide on pragmatic grounds which account to use according to our specific needs determined by a specific problem. Nonetheless, it would be useful to have a unified account of function. This can allow a richer notion of anticipation, and might help us to attend to significant factors that we might otherwise ignore.
The two competing accounts of function are the etiological account, according to which the function of something is what it was selected to do, it having been selected because it does exactly that thing. The other account is based in the organizational role, so that the functionality of some part of an organized system is its contribution to the functionality of the overall system. I will go over the general form of both approaches, showing their relative advantages and disadvantages, and then I will offer a way to unify their best aspects into a single approach. Unlike my previous work connecting autonomy and process closure to functionality (Collier 1999 (Collier , 2000 , this work address the two main competing views, offering my own view as a way to resolve their differences.
TWO VERSIONS OF FUNCTION
The more popular of the two basic approaches to function is the etiological account. It pays special attention to causal origins, and is, in biology at least, amenable to a mechanical analysis. The original formal model is due to Wright (1973) , but it was implicit in much of selectionist thought, and has been used either explicitly or implicitly by Richard Dawkins, most sociobiologists, optimality theorists, genic reductionists, and many other biologists. The idea that the function of some part of an artifact is to fulfill some designed intent is also an etiological account, except that in this case the selection is done intentionally. According to the etiological account, the function of a trait is to F if and only if the trait exists because it Fs. For example, the etiological account of function explains that the function of the heart is to pump blood, since the heart was selected for its blood pumping; i.e., the heart has survived selection processes because it pumps blood. On this account, adaptations are traits that are selected for their survival value, while the properties of artifacts are selected because they fit some design goals.
The etiological account is the current standard in biology, and has been adopted by Richard Dawkins, most sociobiologists, and others who adopt either an explicit or implicit selectionism (either exclusively or as the central explanatory principle in biology). Ruth Millikan (1989) takes this view with respect to semantics, with meaning being ultimately grounded in biological function resulting from selection (a view called teleosemantics). Karen Neander (1991) introduced the notion of a proper function, which is determined by what the trait was selected to do. Robert Cummins, though he also uses internal organization as criterion for function, also has a fairly mechanical model of function that is compatible with the etiological account. The etiological account is by nature externalist: function is externally imposed (design or selection for), and is determined by external relations.
The second version of function is the organizational account, which is highly formal in its current manifestations. The organizational account explains the function of something in terms of its role in maintaining an organization. For example, the heart is functional because it plays the role of a pump in the blood circulatory system of an organism thereby supplying nutrients and removing wastes as required for the survival of the organism. Adaptations are functional traits are adapted in that they are selected for their contribution to an organism's viability, while the properties of artifacts are chosen because of their role in the overall design of the artifact. This account is a very old and traditional account, going back to Aristotle, that has been revived recently with more precision.
Typical proponents are Robert Rosen (1991) who argues that the organization of living things is closed to efficient causation, requiring a relational biology, grounded in MR accounts of embodiment in material causation. Maturana and Varela (1980) use the notion of autopoiesis, which is closed to information, and leads to a phenomenological approach to the mind. Unlike the etiological account, the organizational account is internalist: function is internally produced, and is determined by internal relations that contribute to overall telos.
The relation of the accounts can take on one of four forms, or some combination of these: a. Incompatible alternatives (inconsistent on the facts):
The two accounts are different and competing explanations of the same phenomena, and can be distinguished by objective empirical tests. b. Incommensurate alternatives (different paradigms):
The two accounts are so different in their fundamental assumptions about the nature of function that no empirical test will be accepted by both sides as an objective test. c. Complementary perspectives:
The two accounts are not really in competition, but give complementary and compatible explanations of the same phenomena, and together can give greater understanding.
d. Complementary domains:
The two accounts are not really in competition because they deal with different aspects of function, and neither alone is empirically complete. The truth is probably that some combination of the above occurs. This makes analysis of their relations quite difficult, and they have tended to be developed independently, with little overlap in the literature.
The accounts share certain advantages, which should be preserved in any attempt at synthesis: a. Both can give a unified account of both adaptations and artifacts. b. Both claim completeness. c. Both claim to account for embodiment of function. d. Both claim to account for teleology of function by reference to some ultimate end. i. for design this is intentional (represented goal --teleological). ii. for selection this is survival (implicit goal -teleonomic). However, the way that the accounts satisfy these requirements is quite different. In order to compare the accounts, we should look at their specific advantages and disadvantages. The advantages should be preserved in a synthetic account as much as possible, while the disadvantages should be eliminated or mitigated.
The advantages and disadvantages for the etiological account are as follows: a. Advantages i. Selection determines the "proper function" of a trait
ii. Functionality is directly related to efficient causation through the causal process of selection iii. The mechanism is simple iv. Functionality involves interaction essentially b. Disadvantages i. Proper functions change, but origin doesn't -"exaptations" and "preaptations" are ad hoc terms to cover functional change and non-selected but otherwise functional traits. Apt traits are subject to selection, but become functional only if selected, even though selection causes no change in the relation between trait and environment in the selected organisms (selection leaves these as they are. Functionality seems, then, to depend on the elimination of other traits that are not involved in the case of interest. ii. The teleological aspect is weak without design iii. The integration of function appears to be relatively accidental iv. The mechanism is too simple to explain biological complexity v. Functionality can be detected without knowing history in most non-contentious cases, so why is etiology essential? Aptness seems to be sufficient for function, but apt traits are not functional unless they have been selected for. For the organizational account, on the other hand the advantages and disadvantages are:
a. Advantages i. Functionality is directly related to goals through the satisfaction of a requirement, namely viability. ii. Functionality is necessarily holistic and organic; changes in functionality always involve changes in organization. This contrasts with the etiological case, in which, changes of function require ad hoc devices such as preaptation and exaptation. b. Disadvantages i. Functionality is diffuse, except in explicit design, e.g., bird's wing versus airplane wing and propeller. In modular systems the functions of flight, propulsion and lift, are separated dynamically, but it is not clear that they are in a bird's wing. This presents problems for individuating functions. ii. It is unclear how functionality can arise without organization, but also vice versa -"chicken and egg" problem. This problem has both logical and generative aspects: It seems that functionality is required to make sense of the organization, but functionality depends on there being organization; furthermore, it is difficult to see how functionality can arise without organization, but organization depends for its maintenance on its functionality. The basic problem is that there seems to be no reason for the organization without functionality, but there also seems to be no functionality without the organization. Maturana suggests that the organization arises spontaneously, but we might wonder how it appears in the process of the early pre-evolution and evolution of life. This demarcation problem must wither involve a sudden break, or else it must be possible for functional organization to appear gradually. Since there is no notion of degree of organization in the account, it is unclear how we would measure the gradual appearance and to decide how much organization is sufficient for life. iii. Organization is only loosely tied to embodiment -very different structures and processes can embody the same function; worse, it seems that many different organizations can satisfy the same function by having the same inputs and outputs iv. Following from iii, the relation between organization and causality is unclear. v. Also following from iii, the internal organization seems to be irrelevant to input/output functionality
SYNTHETIC ACCOUNT OF FUNCTION
We need an account of function that combines internal and external aspects, since both are important to functionality. The account must include both the open (interactive) and closed (organizational) aspects of functionality. The account should include both the teleology and the holistic aspects of the organizational account with the causal and modular aspects of the etiological account, inasmuch as possible. The account should avoid vicious circularities and infinite regresses, both logical and generative. To satisfy these requirements, I use a bit of conceptual engineering, some applied metaphysics. Usually, philosophers would analyze the meaning of preestablished ideas, and test these analyses against our intuitions about meanings. My aim, though, is to produce a concept that fits some established requirements, but for which there is not a pre-established meaning. Part of the problem, in this case, as Kant observed, is that the old ideas just won't work. Analysis alone can only take us in circles.
An appropriate concept to ground function 1) requires that the account of function is dynamical, to preserve the interactive aspect, but functionality must essentially involve organization as well. We are therefore talking in terms of process organization, or organized processes. These processes must be closed in some way, but must also be open interactively; requiring process closure of sort, but also interactive closure, if interaction is to be part of the organization. 2) the account requires that there is some holistic entity that functionality is for. Otherwise there is no clear end or purpose for the function. Any adequate account of functionality must identify this entity, or at least give a means for determining its individuality. From 1. and 2. together, this entity is characterized by organizational process and interactive closure. At the same time, processes must be integrated in some way, but not so integrated that they can cannot vary in different causally independent dimensions (otherwise we will run into problems of logical or generative circularity). Thus, minimally, we need a notion of individuation or unity based in an open system organizational process closure in which the process closure results in the viability of the very system it individuates. We could abbreviate this to OSOPC-PCVSR, but for convenience our research group calls it autonomy, because it corresponds with many central pretheoretic ideas about autonomy. I caution, though, that the issue of whether or not the constructed idea is really autonomy is not the issue, though Kant's discussion of organization in the Critique of Judgment suggests that there is a deep connection that is worth further investigation.
With these requirements, we can say that autonomy is both open and closed, that is, it requires conditions that explain closure, but permit openness. Furthermore, autonomy is closely related to individuality and self-governance, the combination of the two yielding independent functionality through the organized interaction of processes. Varela (1979 , 1996a , 1996b , Varela et al 1991 invokes a duality between structure and organization that sets up the problems of multiple implementability that follow from the complete informational closure of organization. In the autonomy approach, processes and their interactions, which are themselves further processes, form the fundamental basis, and organization is a direct property of this network of processes. Therefore, there is no duality between the informational and the causal on this model.
DEFINITION OF AUTONOMY
The idea of autonomy can be defined, or, in line with the conceptual engineering idea, constructed, by starting with well-known philosophical notions, and then restricting these by adding further conditions until we arrive at a suitable definition. I start with identity (Collier 2002 (Collier , 2004 , since as remarked above, function must be grounded in some entity which the function is for.
1. Identity, A = B a. Logical condition, same for all things b. Equivalence relation: symmetric, transitive, closed c. A = B implies that B has every property that A has, and vice versa This tells us virtually nothing, since it is a purely logical relation, but it does put these logical constraints on any concept of autonomy. The next move is to look at what makes parts of something parts of that thing. This is provided by the unity relation. It is empirical question what satisfies U(A) for a given A. Typically the type of unity relation will depend on the sort of thing A is. Autonomous entities, as noted above, must be dynamical entities, so the sort of unity relation we need a dynamical form of unity. In previous writing, I have called this cohesion (Collier 1986 (Collier , 1988 ):
3. Cohesion, C(A), dynamical unity Cohesion is the unity relation for dynamical objects, such that: a. All parts aCb are dynamical b. C is dynamical Simple examples of cohesion a quartz crystal The closure of intermolecular interactions gives the boundary of the crystal, external interactions being much weaker than internal interactions. a gas in a box
The cohesion of the box defines the boundaries of the gas.
• Note that in each case the cohesion is not absolute; it is a matter of degree. This is typical of dynamical properties, and presents a significant difference from logical properties (though fuzzy sets and the like can be a useful tool for such cases).
• Cohesion can differ in strength in different dimensions (factors).
• We really need a cohesion profile to individuate an object • Cohesion both unifies a dynamical object, and distinguishes it from other dynamical objects.
• Thus, it is quite effective as a criterion of individuation.
• We should expect difficult intermediate cases. These arise when cohesion is weak in at least one dimension (see slime mould example below).
• Its real strength, however, is in the way it forces us to look for dynamical closure whenever we want to claim that something is individuated.
• This is especially significant in the case of autonomy. I will give an example ("broken wing behavior" in bird) below. Autonomy is a special type of cohesion that is maintained actively though the contributions of component process to the continued existence of the system, either directly, or through intermediate processes. The requirements of autonomy place certain restrictions on what sort of organized system might be autonomous. It should be obvious that neither a rock nor a gas in a box is autonomous, since they are not active in any sense. To be active requires doing work. Doing work, in turn, requires the existence of non-equilibrium conditions -this means that there must be available resources to make use of. I cannot stress too much that autonomy is impossible unless there are sufficient resources available for use. Neither a rock nor a gas in a box is autonomous because they cannot alter their own state to respond to processes that go across their boundaries. Thus they are unable to adapt to conditions around them, and certainly not to anticipate them. In order to have this sort of self control, a system must be internally differentiated, that is, it cannot be in a uniform steady state, but must have a number of internal states that are dynamically accessible. This requires a certain flexibility that systems whose cohesion is based in high energy differentials cannot maintain. Thus we can expect it to be characteristic of autonomous systems that energy is not their primary concern, but rather organization of their processes so as to divert energy as suitable for their survival. It would be proper, then, to describe autonomous systems, and the degree of autonomy itself, in terms of relative organization rather than in terms of relative energies of interactions. This is coherent with the intuition behind autopoiesis that organization is of central significance. Furthermore, since processes contributing to autonomous cohesion must be coordinated so as to achieve viability, we should expect autonomous systems to show holistic organization of a hierarchical sort in which open aspects of lower level processes are closed at higher levels. However, unlike in autopoietic systems, this closure need never be complete. While internal process closure (sometimes called operational closure) is to some degree essential, there will also be interactive closure among processes, both within the internal infrastructure and with features of the external environment. This means that autonomy must be open to the outside. We require only that the internal organizational closure is greater than the interactive closure. (Centripetal forces > centrifugal forces).
In practice, application of the autonomy concept presents some difficulties. Comparing degrees of organization is non-trivial. In algorithmic complexity theory, logical depth, or the number of steps required to produce a surface structure from a deep structure, is often taken as a measure of organization. This value, though, is difficult to compute under the best of circumstances, and often impossible. (Henri Atlan uses a somewhat different notion that he calls sophistication, which bears some similarities to logical depth.) Fortunately, differences in organization are often large, and are correspondingly easy to recognize. Thus it is not impossible to pick out many autonomous systems, and even to compare their degree of autonomy, and further to compare autonomy in various respects. Because cohesion, and thus autonomy, comes in degrees (and degrees in various dimensions, at that), there will be cases that are difficult to classify, for example, slime mould. But this is as it should be, since the world does really contain such intermediate cases. This is quite different from autopoiesis, which is an all or nothing, and quite indiscriminate condition (Varela 1979) .
In summary, autonomy requires non-equilibrium conditions, internal dynamical differentiation, hierarchical and interactive process organization, incomplete closure, openness to the world, and openness to infrastructural inputs from the material basis of the organization. The existence of autonomy, like any cohesion, is identical to the corresponding process closure, and is not something complementary to, or over and above, this closure. When we want to look for autonomy, we should look for the appropriate types of process closure. Since one of the central elements of the notion of unity, and thus of cohesion and autonomy, is an empirical component, we cannot decide a priori what things or systems are autonomous. This is at least in part a scientific question that requires observation and experiment.
From this account of autonomy, we can determine some likely properties of autonomous systems. First, they will tend to exhibit both levels of organization and modularity. This is because self-interaction is essential, and this is most efficiently done with a certain degree of modularity. Secondly, these modules must be largely closed (cohesive), but must also be open, in sense, they must be dynamically penetrable to play a part in organization. Thirdly, the system will show levels of organization (and perhaps structure) because the modules must be integrated so that the organization can be closed. Just as with the modules, the levels must be cohesive to maintain their identity, but they must also be open to lower level and higher level influences in order to perform their integrative tasks.
FUNCTIONALITY
Functionality derives from autonomy through its contribution to self-preservation, or viability of an autonomous entity. This dependence can be either direct or indirect; lower level functions can serve higher level functions, and so on, but ultimately the functions have to be for the sake of an autonomous entity. One twist on this interdependence is that autonomous entities are usually, if not always, emergent. Thus functionality cannot be reduced to the purely mechanical processes of the substrate of the organization. Furthermore, autonomous entities can emerge for other autonomous entities, either from individuals or interacting collections. These higher level autonomous entities can have functions that conflict with lower level functions. For example, biologically, suicide or even the decision not to reproduce is not functional. However, since the mind has some degree of emergent autonomy from the body, it can over-rule the functionality of the body, though this might cause some inner conflict or distress. Similarly, a tribe or even a state can achieve some degree of autonomy from the individuals who make it up. It can thus have functions that do not necessarily coincide with individual members, nor, indeed, with those of any individual member.
The requirement that functionality must be grounded in autonomy (and is, furthermore, partly constitutive of autonomy) ensures that it involves what Dubois (2003) calls strong anticipation. Weak anticipation is directed purely at external systems. The etiological concept of functionality, on its own, requires no more than this. The organizational account, however, requires internally directed anticipation (and there is a sense in which interactive processes that close through the external environment are really internal), and fits the main condition for strong anticipation. Furthermore, given that autonomy constitutes the individuation of an autonomous entity, and that it is not mechanically reducible, functionality follows from internally constructed processes. The essential openness of autonomy allows that functionality can depend on future states involving constructed closures, despite the fact that autonomy is itself an invariant. This is especially relevant in dealing with unexpected circumstances (Collier 2001) in which the autonomy of a system is reshaped by impinging influences so that similar influences can be accommodated in the future. The maintenance of autonomy under such conditions requires the construction of a state that maintains autonomy (and thus functionality) into the future.
On the other hand, Dubois' characterization of anticipation requires a modeling within the system of the system to be predicted, external in the case of weak anticipation, and internal in terms of strong anticipation. On the present account, even though functionality best fits the idea of strong anticipation, there need be no model of the system of itself, except in a very abstract sense. In effect, the autonomy of the system is its own model; it is genuinely selfdirecting. On Aristotelean accounts of action, nothing can be self-directing (Juarrero 1999) . The Aristotelean view requires a logical separation of agent and subject that seems to require the self-modeling account in order to maintain the requisite separation. Juarrero shows, though, that the dynamical approach obviates the need for this separation: there is no need for separation of system and model in order to embody self-direction. The autonomy account of functionality, by dynamically embodying functionality in the very processes that make up autonomy, unifies both agent and action inextricably. This is possible only because the non-mechanical nature of autonomy allows us to escape the causal model of bumps and nudges that must be traced back to some further source. I believe that the notion of a self-model required for self-anticipation is an artifact of the Aristotelean view, and that it can and should be dispelled, except for those cases in which there is a dynamical modularization of modeling processes.
It is common to talk of the function of some component or process, but the autonomy account of functionality allows that functionality can be diffuse, and not easily localized, so talk of specific function is not always warranted even though there may be functionality. Proper functions certainly exist, but they are possible only when the functional subsystem has become stabilized and modularized, for example, as the heart has become a separate and more or less modular organ through evolution. Many aspects of function, however, are not so highly modularized, and all we can talk about is functionality, rather than the proper function of some part or aspect of the organism. This presumably applies to mental phenomena as well.
Closure places severe restrictions on what can qualify as autonomous. This has consequences for determinations of functionality and partship, which in turn has implications for satisfactory explanations. First, explanations of parts must be open-ended in order to allow for the open character of their interactions with other parts. However, complete explanations must not leave functional processes open, but should at least define the classes of appropriate inputs and outputs in a way that is compatible with their grounding in dynamical organization. Explanations should be constructed or rendered so that modular and nesting connections can be made, and explanations in terms of organization or energy and matter flows alone are incomplete; the two must correspond in every detail at the appropriate level.
It is surprisingly easy, without paying attention to closure conditions, to misidentify what entity a function serves, and thus to misexplain the function. For example, some birds exhibit a behavior pattern of circling around as if they have a broken wing when some potential predator approaches their nest. This has the effect of distracting the predator form the nest, because it thinks that the bird is an easy target. One might think that this is functional for the bird, but it in fact it puts the bird at some risk. If we look at the closure conditions, however, the distracting motion leads the predator away from the nest, thus saving the eggs from being eaten. We might want to say, then, that the function is for the sake of the survival of the eggs. However this is not correct either, since the behavior cycles through the bird, and the eggs are not at this point autonomous. A more sophisticated account might be that the behavior functions for the bird because it increases the bird's inclusive fitness. This is really just another way of saying, however, that the function aids the bird's genes to reproduce, and that the function serves the lineage of the bird, not the bird itself. The eggs, even though they are passive participants in this case, play an essential role in the functionality of the behavior. This is not to say that the eggs, or the bird, are not themselves autonomous, or have some degree of autonomy, but rather that they are not proper focus for functional explanation in this case. Although it is questionable whether we can properly call a lineage autonomous, it is not unreasonable to hold that it has some degree of autonomy, and that the functionality of the behavior serves this autonomy, and not that of the bird (which is put a risk), or of the eggs.
These considerations have several implications for research. Closure suggests where to look to complete explanations in terms of required elements, the place of these elements, and which element the function is for. They also both restrict and suggest appropriate questions to ask functionally and materially about the target system. In fact considerations of closure may well determine that the target system is not the appropriate system to target at all.
CONCLUSION
Functionality can be grounded in a dynamical individuating condition called autonomy that is sufficiently closed to provide identity conditions, but open enough that the system is open to energy, matter and information flows. The condition is maintained actively through the internal application of work to maintain an organizational structure that is self-maintaining, but interactively so. Functions are for the sake of autonomous entities, and functionality is part of the process based organizational closure that constitutes autonomy. There is no material distinction between function and its embodiment. Functionality, because it contributes to system viability, is more likely to be selected, hence its existence depends on environmental conditions as well as internal organization.
